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LARGE RISKS, LIMITED LIABILITY, AND
DYNAMIC MORAL HAZARD
BY BRUNO BIAIS, THOMAS MARIOTTI, JEAN-CHARLES ROCHET
AND STÉPHANE VILLENEUVE1
We study a continuous-time principal–agent model in which a risk-neutral agent with
limited liability must exert unobservable effort to reduce the likelihood of large but rel-
atively infrequent losses. Firm size can be decreased at no cost or increased subject to
adjustment costs. In the optimal contract, investment takes place only if a long enough
period of time elapses with no losses occurring. Then, if good performance continues,
the agent is paid. As soon as a loss occurs, payments to the agent are suspended, and so
is investment if further losses occur. Accumulated bad performance leads to downsiz-
ing. We derive explicit formulae for the dynamics of firm size and its asymptotic growth
rate, and we provide conditions under which firm size eventually goes to zero or grows
without bounds.
KEYWORDS: Principal–agent model, limited liability, continuous time, Poisson risk,
downsizing, investment, firm size dynamics.
1. INTRODUCTION
INDUSTRIAL AND FINANCIAL FIRMS are subject to large risks: the former are
prone to accidents and the latter are exposed to sharp drops in the value
of their assets. Preventing these risks requires managerial effort. Systematic
analyses of industrial accidents point to the role of human deficiencies and in-
adequate levels of care.2 A striking illustration is offered by the explosion at
1We thank a co-editor, and three anonymous referees for very thoughtful and detailed com-
ments. We also thank Ron Anderson, Dirk Bergemann, Peter DeMarzo, Ivar Ekeland, Eduardo
Faingold, Michael Fishman, Jean-Pierre Florens, Xavier Gabaix, Christian Gollier, Alexander
Gümbel, Zhiguo He, Christian Hellwig, Augustin Landier, Ali Lazrak, Erzo Luttmer, George
Mailath, Roger Myerson, Thomas Philippon, Bernard Salanié, Yuliy Sannikov, Hyun Song Shin,
Dimitri Vayanos, Nicolas Vieille, and Wei Xiong for very valuable feedback. Finally, we thank
seminar audiences at Imperial College London, New York University, Oxford-Man Institute of
Quantitative Finance, Princeton University, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Université Paris 1,
Universiteit van Tilburg, University College London, University of Edinburgh, University of War-
wick, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, and Yale University, as well as confer-
ence participants at the 2007 CEPR Corporate Finance and Risk Management Conference, the
2007 IDEI–LERNA Conference on Environment and Resource Economics, the 2007 Oxford
Finance Summer Symposium, the 2008 Cowles Summer Conference, the 2008 Pacific Institute
for the Mathematical Sciences Summer School in Finance, the 2009 Institut Finance Dauphine
Workshop on Dynamic Risk Sharing, and the 2009 Paul Woolley Centre for Capital Market Dys-
functionality Conference for many useful discussions. Financial support from the Chaire Finance
Durable et Investissement Responsable, the Chaire Marchés des Risques et Création de Valeur,
the ERC Starting Grant 203929-ACAP, the Europlace Institute of Finance, and the Fédération
Française des Sociétés d’Assurances is gratefully acknowledged.
2See, for instance, Leplat and Rasmussen (1984), Gordon, Flin, Mearns, and Fleming (1996),
or Hollnagel (2002).
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the BP Texas refinery in March 2005. After investigating the case, the Baker
panel concluded that “BP executive and corporate refining management have
not provided effective process safety leadership.”3 Similarly, the large losses
incurred by banks and insurance companies during the recent financial crisis
were in part due to insufficient risk control. These large risks present a ma-
jor challenge to firms, investors, and citizens. This paper studies the design of
incentives to mitigate them.
One way to stimulate the prevention of large risks would be to make man-
agers and firms bear the social costs that they generate. Yet, this is often impos-
sible in practice, because total damages often exceed the wealth of managers
and even the net worth of firms, while the former are protected by limited li-
ability and the latter by bankruptcy laws.4 This curbs managers’ incentives to
reduce the risk of losses that exceed the value of their own assets.5 Of course,
if the risk prevention activities undertaken by managers were observable, it
would be straightforward to design compensation schemes that would induce
them to take socially optimal levels of risk. To a large extent, however, these
activities are unobservable by external parties, which leads to a moral hazard
problem.
In addition to informational asymmetries, another important aspect of large
risks lies in their timing. Large losses are relatively rare events that contrast
with day-to-day firm operations and cash flows.6 It is, therefore, natural to
study large risk prevention in a dynamic setup, where the timing of losses dif-
fers from that of operations. To do so, we focus on the simplest model: operat-
ing cash flows are constant per unit of time, while losses occur according to a
Poisson process whose intensity depends on the level of risk prevention.
In this context, we study the optimal contract between a principal and an
agent that provides the latter with appropriate incentives to reduce the risk of
losses under dynamic moral hazard. The agent, who can be thought of as an
entrepreneur or a manager running a business, is risk-neutral and protected by
limited liability. She can exert effort to reduce the instantaneous probability
3“The Report of the BP U.S. Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel,” January 16, 2007.
Also, Chemical Safety Board Chairman Carolyn W. Merritt stated that “BP’s global management
was aware of problems with maintenance, spending, and infrastructure well before March 2005.
[  ] Unsafe and antiquated equipment designs were left in place, and unacceptable deficiencies
in preventative maintenance were tolerated” (“CSB Investigation of BP Texas City Refinery Dis-
aster Continues as Organizational Issues Are Probed,” CSB News Release, October 30, 2006).
4For instance, Katzman (1988) reported that “In Ohio v. Kovacs (U.S.S.C. 83-1020), the U.S.
Supreme Court unanimously ruled that an industrial polluter can escape an order to clean up a
toxic waste site under the umbrella of federal bankruptcy.” Similarly, the social losses created by
the recent financial crisis exceeded by far the assets one could withhold from financial executives.
5Shavell (1984, 1986) discussed how a party’s inability to pay for the full magnitude of harm
done dilutes its incentives to reduce risk.
6From now on, we generically refer to any realization of a large risk as a loss.
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of losses.7 Effort is costly to the agent and unobservable by other parties. The
project run by the agent can expand, through investment, or shrink, through
downsizing. While downsizing is unconstrained, we assume that the pace of
investment is limited by adjustment costs, in the spirit of Hayashi (1982) or
Kydland and Prescott (1982). We also assume constant returns to scale, in that
downsizing and investment affect, by the same factor, the operating profits of
the project, the social costs of accidents, and the private benefits that the agent
derives from shirking. This assumption implies that the principal’s value func-
tion is homogeneous in size and enables us to characterize the optimal contract
explicitly. However, as discussed in the paper, some of our key qualitative re-
sults are robust to relaxing the constant returns to scale assumption.
The optimal contract maximizes the expected value that the principal derives
from an incentive feasible risk prevention policy. It relies on two instruments:
positive payments to the agent and project size management through down-
sizing and investment. While these decisions are functions of the entire past
history of the loss process, this complex history dependence can be summa-
rized by two state variables: the size of the project and the continuation utility
of the agent. The former reflects the history of past downsizing and investment
decisions, while the latter reflects the prospect of future payments to the agent.
The evolution of the agent’s continuation utility mirrors the dynamics of losses
and thus serves as a track record of the agent’s performance.8 We characterize
the compensation and size management policy that arise in the optimal con-
tract.
First consider the compensation policy. To motivate the agent, the optimal
contract relies on the promise of payments after good performance and the
threat of reductions in her continuation utility after losses. When the track
record of the agent is relatively poor, there is a probation phase during which
she does not receive any payment. As long as no loss occurs, the size-adjusted
continuation utility of the agent increases until it reaches a threshold at which
she receives a constant wage per unit of time and size of the project, such that
her size-adjusted continuation utility remains constant. As soon as a loss oc-
curs, the continuation utility of the agent undergoes a sharp reduction and the
contract reverts to the probation phase. The magnitude of that reduction in the
agent’s continuation utility is pinned down by the incentive compatibility con-
straint. The more severe the moral hazard problem and the larger the project,
the greater the punishment. The induced sensitivity of the agent’s continuation
utility to the random occurrence of losses is socially costly because the princi-
pal’s value function is concave in that state variable. Therefore, it is optimal
7Unlike in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) or Akerlof and Katz (1989), effort in our model merely
makes losses less likely, but does not eliminate them altogether. As a result, losses do occur on
the equilibrium path, and it is no longer optimal to systematically terminate the principal–agent
relationship following a loss.
8That the optimal contract exhibits memory is a standard feature of dynamic moral hazard
models, see for instance Rogerson (1985).
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to set the reduction in the agent’s continuation utility following a loss to the
minimum level consistent with incentive compatibility.
Next consider the dynamics of the size of the project. In the first-best case,
there is no need for downsizing. Since the project has positive net present
value, investment then always takes place at the highest feasible rate so as to
maximize the size of the project. In the second-best case, however, the size
of the project is lower than in the first-best. The intuition is the following. As
mentioned above, the agent is partly motivated by the threat of reductions in
her continuation utility in case of bad performance. Yet, when the continua-
tion utility of the agent is low, the threat to reduce it further has limited bite,
because of limited liability. To cope with this limitation, it can be necessary to
lower the agent’s temptation to shirk by reducing the scale of operations after
losses. Apart from such circumstances, and in particular when no loss occurs,
the project is never downsized. In addition to downsizing, moral hazard also
affects the size of the project through its impact on investment. Since increases
in the size of the project raise the temptation to shirk, investment can take
place only when the agent has enough at stake in the project, that is, when her
track record has been good enough for her continuation utility to reach a given
threshold. While payments when they occur are costly for the principal, invest-
ment benefits both parties. As long as investment takes place, the total size
of the pie grows, which in turn makes delaying the compensation of the agent
less costly. Thus it is efficient to invest before actually compensating the agent.
Note that the sequencing of compensation and investment is reversed in the
first-best case. This is because the agent, who is assumed to be more impatient
than the principal, then receives all her compensation at time zero, before any
investment actually takes place.
We obtain an explicit formula that maps the path of the agent’s size-adjusted
continuation utility into the size of the project. If one interprets the latter
as firm size, this formula exactly spells out how firm size grows, stays con-
stant, or declines over time. Relying on asymptotic theory for Markov ergodic
processes, we then characterize the long-run growth rate of the firm. In the
first-best case, firm size goes to infinity at a constant rate. Our formula for
the long-run growth rate of the firm shows how, in the second-best case, this
trend in firm size is reduced by downsizing and possibly lower investment rates.
When the adjustment costs are high, firm size eventually goes to zero. By con-
trast, when both the adjustment costs and the frequency of losses are low, firm
size eventually goes to infinity, although more slowly than in the first-best case.
Our paper belongs to the rich and growing literature on dynamic moral haz-
ard that uses recursive techniques to characterize optimal dynamic contracts.9
9See, for instance, Green (1987), Spear and Srivastava (1987), Thomas and Worrall (1990), or
Phelan and Townsend (1991) for seminal contributions along these lines. By focusing on the case
where the agent is risk-neutral, with limited liability, our model is in line with the recent papers
by Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) and DeMarzo and Fishman (2007a, 2007b).
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One of our contributions relative to this literature is to study the case where
moral hazard is about large but relatively infrequent risks. As illustrated by re-
cent industrial accidents or by the recent financial crisis, preventing such risks
is a major challenge. We show that optimal contracts that mitigate the risk of
infrequent but large losses differ markedly from those that prevail when fluc-
tuations in the output process are frequent but infinitesimal. In the latter, as
illustrated by the Brownian motion models of DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006),
Biais, Mariotti, Plantin, and Rochet (2007), or Sannikov (2008), the continua-
tion utility of the agent continuously fluctuates until it reaches zero, an event
that is predictable. At this point, the project is liquidated. In contrast, with
Poisson risk, the continuation utility of the agent increases smoothly most of
the time, but incurs sharp decreases when losses occur. In this context, incen-
tive compatibility together with limited liability imply unpredictable downsiz-
ing, unlike in the Brownian case.
Another contribution of this paper relative to the literature is to analyze
the interplay between incentive considerations and firm size dynamics, and in
particular to study the long-run impact of downsizing and investment on firm
size under moral hazard. Our analysis of the interactions between incentives
and investment is in line with DeMarzo and Fishman (2007a). In a finite hori-
zon, discrete-time framework, they derived a number of predictions regarding
the relationship between current investment, current and past cash flows, and
agent’s compensation. They showed that these predictions are relatively insen-
sitive to the specific nature of the agency problem, provided its static version
has a certain structure. Thanks to the finiteness of the horizon, these results
are derived recursively, starting from the final period. Our analysis first differs
from DeMarzo and Fishman’s (2007a) in that our starting point is a stationary
continuous-time model, which raises further conceptual and technical difficul-
ties. Second, to derive sharper implications from the analysis, we consider a
particular type of informational friction, namely a moral hazard problem with
Poisson uncertainty. This modeling approach enables us to precisely charac-
terize the properties of the optimal contract, to provide an explicit formula
for the dynamics of firm size, and ultimately to conduct an asymptotic analy-
sis of its long-run evolution and that of the agent’s utility. In particular, a key
insight of our analysis is that, when investment is taken into account, it need
not be the case that the firm eventually vanishes and that the agent’s utility
eventually goes to zero. This contrasts with the classic immiserization result
of Thomas and Worrall (1990). This also contrasts with the contemporaneous
work by DeMarzo, Fishman, He, and Wang (2008), who studied the dynam-
ics of average and marginal q in a Brownian model of agency and investment
with convex adjustment costs and constant returns to scale. In their model, as
in ours, the agent’s continuation utility and the current capital stock are suf-
ficient statistics for the optimal contract. An important difference is that, in
DeMarzo, Fishman, He, and Wang (2008), the firm will eventually be liqui-
dated when the agent’s size-adjusted utility reaches zero, which occurs with
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probability 1. By contrast, in our Poisson model, the size-adjusted utility of the
agent is bounded away from zero, and incentives are provided by partial down-
sizing instead of outright liquidation. As a result, the firm can grow without
bounds when adjustment costs are low enough so that investment outweighs
downsizing.
In the context of a political economy model, Myerson (2008) contempora-
neously offered an analysis of dynamic moral hazard in a Poisson framework.
A distinctive feature of our paper is that we analyze the impact of investment
on the principal–agent relationship. Moreover, Myerson (2008) considered the
case where the principal and the agent have identical discount rates. This case,
however, is not conducive to continuous-time analysis, as an optimal contract
does not exist. To cope with this difficulty, Myerson (2008) imposed an exoge-
nous upper bound on the continuation utility of the agent. By contrast, we do
not impose such a constraint on the set of feasible contracts. Instead, we con-
sider the case where the principal is less impatient than the agent. While this
makes the formal analysis more complex, it also restores the existence of an
unconstrained optimal contract.
Sannikov (2005) also used a Poisson payoff structure. A key difference with
our analysis lies in the way output is affected by the jumps of the Poisson
process. In Sannikov (2005), jumps correspond to positive cash-flow shocks,
while in our model they correspond to losses that are less likely to occur if the
agent exerts effort.10 This leads to qualitatively very different results. While
downsizing is a key feature of our optimal contract, as it ensures that incen-
tives can still be provided following a long sequence of losses, it plays no role
in Sannikov (2005). Liquidation in his model is still required to provide incen-
tives, but it corresponds to a predictable event: if a sufficiently long period of
time elapses during which the agent reports no cash flow, the firm is liquidated.
By contrast, downsizing in our model is unpredictable.11
Our paper is also related to the literature on accident law. Shavell (1986,
2000) argued that the desirability of liability insurance depends on the ability
of insurers to monitor the firm’s prevention effort and to link insurance premia
to the observed level of care. If insurers cannot observe the firm’s level of care,
making full liability insurance mandatory results in no care at all being taken.12
In our dynamic analysis, the optimal contract ties the firm’s allowed activity
level to its performance record: following a series of losses, the firm can be
forbidden to engage at full scale in its risky activity. These instruments provide
10Thus jumps in our model are bad news in the sense of Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce (1991).
11Poisson processes have also proved useful in the theory of repeated games with imperfect
monitoring; see, for instance, Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce (1991), Kalesnik (2005), and San-
nikov and Skrzypacz (2010). Our focus differs from theirs in that we consider a full commitment
contracting environment, in which we explicitly characterize the optimal incentive compatible
contract.
12See Jost (1996) and Polborn (1998) for important extensions and qualifications of this argu-
ment.
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the manager of the firm with dynamic incentives to exert the appropriate risk
prevention effort, although the latter is not observed by the principal.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
formulates the incentive compatibility and limited liability constraints. Sec-
tion 4 characterizes the optimal contract under maximal risk prevention. Based
on this analysis, Section 5 studies the dynamics of firm size. Section 6 discusses
the robustness of our results. Section 7 derives some empirical implications of
our theoretical analysis. Section 8 concludes. Sketches of proofs are provided
in the Appendix. Complete proofs are available in the Supplemental Material
(Biais, Mariotti, Rochet, and Villeneuve (2010)).
2. THE MODEL
There are two players: a principal and an agent. The agent can run a poten-
tially profitable project for which she has unique necessary skills.13 However,
this project entails costs, and the agent has limited liability and no initial cash.
By contrast, the principal has unlimited liability and is able to cover the costs.
Think of the agent as an entrepreneur or a manager running a business, and
think of the principal as a financier, an insurance company, or society at large.
Time is continuous and the project can be operated over an infinite horizon.
The two players are risk-neutral. The principal discounts the future at rate
r > 0 and the agent discounts at rate ρ > r, which makes her more impatient
than the principal. This introduces a wedge between the valuation of future
transfers by the principal and the agent, and rules out indefinitely postponing
payments to the latter. Without loss of generality, we normalize to 0 the setup
cost of the project.
At any time t, the size Xt of the project can be scaled up or down. There are
no constraints on downsizing: any fraction of the assets between 0 and 1 can be
instantaneously liquidated. For simplicity, we normalize the maximal possible
initial size of the project to 1 and assume that the liquidation value of the assets
is 0. The project can also be expanded at unit cost c ≥ 0. The rate at which such
investments can take place is constrained, however. This reflects, for instance,
that new plants cannot be built instantaneously or that the inflow of new skilled
workers is constrained by search and training. Consistent with this, we assume
that the instantaneous growth rate gt of the project is at most equal to γ ∈
(0 r). This is in line with the macroeconomic literature that emphasizes the
delays and costs associated with investment, such as time-to-build constraints
(Kydland and Prescott (1982)) or convex adjustment costs (Hayashi (1982)).
Our formulation corresponds to a simple version of the adjustment cost model
13Empirically, this assumption is particularly relevant in the case of small businesses, where
the entrepreneur-manager is often indispensable for operating the firm efficiently (Sraer and
Thesmar (2007)).
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in which there are no adjustment costs up to an instantaneous size adjustment
Xtγ dt and infinite adjustment costs beyond this point.
Operating profits per unit of time are equal to Xtμ, where μ> 0 is a constant
that represents day-to-day size-adjusted operating profits. While such profits
are constant, the project is subject to the risk of large losses. In the case of
a manufacturing firm, such losses can be generated by a severe accident. In
the case of a financial firm, they can result from a sudden and sharp decrease
in the value of the assets in which the firm invested. The occurrence of these
losses is modeled as a point process N = {Nt}t≥0, where for each t ≥ 0, Nt is the
number of losses up to and including time t. Denote by (Tk)k≥1 the successive
random times at which these losses occur. A loss generates costs that are borne
by the principal rather than by the agent. For example, an oil spill imposes huge
damages on the environment and on the inhabitants of the affected region, but
has limited direct impact on the manager of the oil company. Alternatively,
in the case of financial firms, the losses incurred by many banks in 2007 and
2008 exceeded what they could cope with, and governments and taxpayers had
to bear the costs. To capture this in our model, we assume that the agent has
limited liability and cannot be held responsible for these losses in excess of her
current wealth, so that it is the principal who has to incur the costs. We assume
that, like operating profits, losses increase linearly with the size of the project.
Thus, if there is a loss at time t, the corresponding cost is XtC, where C > 0
is the size-adjusted cost. Overall, the net output flow generated by the project
during the infinitesimal time interval (t t + dt] is Xt(μdt −C dNt).
By exerting effort, the agent affects the probability with which losses occur: a
higher effort reduces the probability Λt dt that a loss occurs during (t t + dt].
For simplicity, we consider only two levels of effort, corresponding to Λt = λ >
0 and Λt = λ+λ, with λ> 0. To model the cost of effort, we adopt the same
convention as Holmström and Tirole (1997): if the agent shirks at time t, that
is, if Λt = λ + λ, she obtains a private benefit XtB; by contrast, if the agent
exerts effort at time t, that is, if Λt = λ, she obtains no private benefit. This
formulation is similar to one in which the agent incurs a constant cost per unit
of time and per unit of size of the project when exerting effort, and incurs no
cost when shirking.
REMARK: It is natural to assume that operating profits and losses are in-
creasing in the size of the project. It is also natural to assume that the opportu-
nity cost of risk prevention is increasing in the size of the project: it takes more
time, effort, and energy to check compliance and monitor safety processes in
two plants than in a single plant, or in a large trading room with many traders
than in a small one. Observe, however, that we require more than monotonic-
ity, since we assume that operating profits, losses, and private benefits are lin-
ear in the size of the project. This constant returns to scale assumption is made
for tractability. As shown in Section 4, it implies that the value function solution
to the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation (23) is homogeneous of degree 1,
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which considerably simplifies the characterization of the optimal contract. Yet,
even without this assumption, some of the qualitative features of our analysis
are upheld, as discussed in Section 6.
We assume throughout the paper that
μ− λC
r
> c(1)
and that
λC >B(2)
The left-hand side of (1) is the present value of the net expected cash flow
generated by one unit of capacity over an infinite horizon when the agent al-
ways exerts effort. The right-hand side of (1) is the cost of an additional unit of
capacity. Condition (1) implies that the project has positive net present value
and that investment is desirable when the agent always exerts effort. The left-
hand side of (2) is the size-adjusted expected social cost of increased risk when
the agent shirks. The right-hand side of (2) is the size-adjusted private bene-
fit from shirking. Condition (2) implies that in the absence of moral hazard,
it is socially optimal to require the agent to always exert effort. The first-best
policy can therefore be characterized as follows: first, the project is initiated at
its maximal capacity of 1 and then it grows at the maximal feasible rate γ with
no downsizing ever taking place; second, a maximal risk prevention policy is
implemented in which the agent always exerts effort.
From now on, we focus on the case where there is asymmetric information.
Specifically, we assume that, unlike profits and losses, the agent’s effort deci-
sions are not observable by the principal. This leads to a moral hazard problem,
whose key parameters are B and λ. The larger the size-adjusted private ben-
efit B is, the more attractive it is for the agent to shirk. The lower λ is, the
more difficult it is to detect shirking. The contract between the principal and
the agent is designed and agreed upon at time 0. The agent reacts to this con-
tract by choosing an effort process Λ= {Λt}t≥0. We assume that the players can
fully commit to a long-term contract.
REMARK: We thus abstract throughout from imperfect commitment prob-
lems and focus on a single source of market imperfection: moral hazard in risk
prevention. This assumption is standard in the dynamic moral hazard litera-
ture; see, for instance, Rogerson (1985), Spear and Srivastava (1987), or Phelan
and Townsend (1991). More precisely, our analysis is in line with Clementi and
Hopenhayn (2006), DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), Biais, Mariotti, Plantin,
and Rochet (2007), DeMarzo and Fishman (2007a, 2007b), or Sannikov (2008),
where limited liability reduces the ability to punish the agent. This compels the
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principal to replace such punishments by actions, such as downsizing or liqui-
dation, that are ex post inefficient.14 When the principal is more patient than
the agent and there is no investment, as in DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) and
Biais, Mariotti, Plantin, and Rochet (2007), this leads to the result that the firm
eventually ceases to exist. By contrast, in the present model, this negative trend
can be outweighed by investment.
A contract specifies downsizing, investment, and liquidation decisions, as
well as payments to the agent, as functions of the history of past losses. The
size process X = {Xt}t≥0 is nonnegative, with initial condition X0 ≤ 1. The size
of the project can be decomposed as
Xt =X0 +Xdt +Xit(3)
for all t ≥ 0, where Xd = {Xdt }t≥0, the cumulative downsizing process, is de-
creasing, and Xi = {Xit }t≥0, the cumulative investment process, is increasing.
Our assumptions imply that Xi is absolutely continuous with respect to time;
that is,
Xit =
∫ t
0
Xsgs ds(4)
where the instantaneous growth rate of the project satisfies
0 ≤ gt ≤ γ(5)
for all t ≥ 0. Because of limited liability, the process L = {Lt}t≥0 which de-
scribes the cumulative transfers to the agent, is nonnegative and increasing.
The time at which liquidation occurs is denoted by τ. We allow τ to be infinite,
and we let Xt = 0 and Lt =Lτ for all t > τ.
At any time t prior to liquidation, the sequence of events during the infini-
tesimal time interval [t t + dt] can heuristically be described as follows:
Step 1. The size Xt of the project is determined, that is, there is downsizing
or investment or the size remains constant.
Step 2. The agent takes her effort decision Λt .
Step 3. With probability Λt dt, there is a loss, in which case dNt = 1; other-
wise dNt = 0.
Step 4. The agent receives a nonnegative transfer dLt .
Step 5. The project is either liquidated or continued.
According to this timing, the downsizing and effort decisions are taken before
knowing the current realization of the loss process. Formally, the processes X
and Λ are FN -predictable, where FN = {FNt }t≥0 is the filtration generated by N .
14For a discussion of renegotiation in this context, see Quadrini (2004), DeMarzo and Sannikov
(2006, Section IV.B), or DeMarzo and Fishman (2007a, Appendix B2, 2007b, Section 2.9).
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By contrast, payment and liquidation decisions at any time are taken after ob-
serving whether there was a loss at this time. Hence L is FN -adapted and τ is
an FN -stopping time.15 An effort process Λ generates a unique probability dis-
tribution PΛ over the paths of the process N . Denote by EΛ the corresponding
expectation operator.
Given a contract Γ = (XLτ) and an effort process Λ, the expected dis-
counted utility of the agent is
EΛ
[∫ τ
0
e−ρt
(
dLt + 1{Λt=λ+λ}XtBdt
)]
(6)
while the expected discounted profit of the principal is16
EΛ
[∫ τ
0
e−rt
{
Xt[(μ− gtc)dt −CdNt] − dLt
}]
(7)
An effort process Λ is incentive compatible with respect to a contract Γ if it
maximizes the agent’s expected utility (6) given Γ . The problem of the princi-
pal is to find a contract Γ and an incentive compatible effort process Λ that
maximize expected discounted profit (7), subject to delivering to the agent a
required expected discounted utility level. It is without loss of generality to fo-
cus on contracts Γ such that the present value of the payments to the agent is
finite, that is,
EΛ
[∫ τ
0
e−ρt dLt
]
<∞(8)
Indeed, by inspection of (7), if the present value of the payments to the agent
were infinite, the fact that ρ > r would imply infinitely negative expected dis-
counted profits for the principal. The latter would be better off proposing no
contract altogether.
3. INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY AND LIMITED LIABILITY
To characterize incentive compatibility, we rely on martingale techniques
similar to those introduced by Sannikov (2008). When taking her effort de-
cision at a time t, the agent considers how it will affect her continuation utility,
defined as
Wt(ΓΛ)= EΛ
[∫ τ
t
e−ρ(s−t)
(
dLs + 1{Λs=λ+λ}XsBds
)∣∣∣FNt
]
1{t<τ}(9)
15See, for instance, Dellacherie and Meyer (1978, Chapter IV, Definitions 12, 49, and 61) for
definitions of these concepts.
16All integrals are of the Lebesgue–Stieltjes kind. For each s and t, we write
∫ t
s
for
∫
[st] and∫ t−
s
for
∫
[st).
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Denote by W (ΓΛ) = {Wt(ΓΛ)}t≥0 the agent’s continuation utility process.
Note that, by construction, W (ΓΛ) is FN -adapted. In particular, Wt(ΓΛ)
reflects whether there was a loss at time t. To characterize how the agent’s con-
tinuation utility evolves over time, it is useful to consider her lifetime expected
utility, evaluated conditionally on the information available at time t, that is,17
Ut(ΓΛ) = EΛ
[∫ τ
0
e−ρs
(
dLs + 1{Λs=λ+λ}XsBds
)∣∣∣FNt
]
(10)
=
∫ t∧τ−
0
e−ρs
(
dLs + 1{Λs=λ+λ}XsBds
)+ e−ρtWt(ΓΛ)
Since Ut(ΓΛ) is the expectation of a given random variable conditional on
FNt , the process U(ΓΛ)= {Ut(ΓΛ)}t≥0 is an FN -martingale under the prob-
ability measure PΛ. Its last element is Uτ(ΓΛ), which is integrable by (8).
Relying on this martingale property, we now offer an alternative representa-
tion of U(ΓΛ). Consider the process MΛ = {MΛt }t≥0 defined by
MΛt =Nt −
∫ t
0
Λs ds(11)
for all t ≥ 0. Equation (11) is best understood when Λ is a constant process.
In that case, MΛt is simply the number of losses up to and including time
t, minus its expectation. More generally, a basic result from the theory of
point processes is that MΛ is an FN -martingale under PΛ. Changes in the ef-
fort process Λ induce changes in the distribution of losses, which essentially
amount to Girsanov transformations of the process N . The martingale repre-
sentation theorem for point processes then implies the following lemma.18
LEMMA 1: The martingale U(ΓΛ) satisfies
Ut(ΓΛ)=U0(ΓΛ)−
∫ t∧τ
0
e−ρsHs(ΓΛ)dMΛs(12)
for all t ≥ 0 PΛ-almost surely for some FN -predictable process H(ΓΛ) =
{Ht(ΓΛ)}t≥0.
Along with (11), (12) implies that the lifetime expected utility of the agent
evolves in response to the jumps of the process N . At any time t, the change
in Ut(ΓΛ) is equal to the product between a FN -predictable function of the
17For each x and y , we denote by x ∧ y the minimum of x and y , and denote by x ∨ y the
maximum of x and y .
18See, for instance, Brémaud (1981, Chapter III, Theorems T9 and T17, and Chapter VI, The-
orems T2 and T3) for the relevant results.
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past, namely e−ρtHt(ΓΛ), and a term −dMΛt that reflects the events occurring
at time t. This term is in turn equal to the difference between the instantaneous
probability Λt dt of a loss and the instantaneous change dNt in the total num-
ber of losses, which is equal to 0 or 1. Equations (10) and (12) imply that the
continuation utility of the agent evolves as
dWt(ΓΛ) =
[
ρWt(ΓΛ)− 1{Λt=λ+λ}XtB
]
dt(13)
+Ht(ΓΛ)(Λt dt − dNt)− dLt
for all t ∈ [0 τ). Equation (13) states that, net of private benefits and wages,
the expected instantaneous change in the continuation utility of the agent is
equal to her discount rate ρ, while H(ΓΛ) is the sensitivity to losses of this
utility. Building on this analysis and letting b= B/λ, we obtain the following
result, in line with Sannikov (2008, Proposition 2).
PROPOSITION 1: A necessary and sufficient condition for the effort process Λ
to be incentive compatible given the contract Γ = (XLτ) is that
Λt = λ if and only if Ht(ΓΛ)≥Xtb(14)
for all t ∈ [0 τ) PΛ-almost surely.
It follows from (13) that if there is a loss at some time t ∈ [0 τ), the agent’s
continuation utility must be instantaneously reduced by an amount Ht(ΓΛ).19
Proposition 1 states that to induce the agent to choose a high level of risk
prevention, this reduction in her continuation utility must be at least as large
as Xtb. This is because Xtb reflects the attractiveness of the private benefits
obtained by the agent when shirking. To reason in size-adjusted terms, let ht =
Ht/Xt . The incentive compatibility condition (14) under which Λt = λ then is
rewritten as
ht ≥ b(15)
It is convenient to introduce the notation Wt−(ΓΛ) = lims↑t Ws(ΓΛ) to de-
note the left-hand limit of the process W (ΓΛ) at t > 0. While Wt(ΓΛ) is the
continuation utility of the agent at time t after observing whether there was a
loss at time t, Wt−(ΓΛ) is the continuation utility of the agent evaluated be-
fore such knowledge is obtained.20 Observe that while the process W (ΓΛ) is
19In full generality, one should also allow for jumps in the transfer process. For incentive rea-
sons, it is, however, never optimal to pay the agent when a loss occurs. Moreover, it will turn out
that the optimal transfer process is absolutely continuous, so that payments do not come in lump
sums. To ease the exposition, we, therefore, rule out jumps in the transfer process in the body of
the paper. The possibility of such jumps is explicitly taken into account below in the verification
theorem.
20W0−(ΓΛ) is defined by (6).
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FN -adapted, the process W·−(ΓΛ) = {Wt−(ΓΛ)}t≥0 is FN -predictable. Com-
bining the fact that the continuation utility of the agent must remain nonneg-
ative according to the limited liability constraint with the fact that it must be
reduced by an amount Ht(ΓΛ) if there is a loss at time t according to (13),
one must have
Wt−(ΓΛ)≥Ht(ΓΛ)(16)
for all t ∈ [0 τ). To simplify notation, we drop the arguments Γ and Λ in the
remainder of the paper.
4. OPTIMAL CONTRACTING WITH MAXIMAL RISK PREVENTION
While in the previous section we considered general effort processes, in the
present section we characterize the optimal contract that induces maximal risk
prevention, that is, Λt = λ for all t ∈ [0 τ). This is in line with most of the lit-
erature on the principal–agent model, which offers more precise insights into
how to implement given courses of actions at minimal cost than into which
course of actions is, all things considered, optimal for the principal.21 In Sec-
tion 6.1, however, we provide sufficient conditions under which it is optimal for
the principal to request maximal risk prevention from the agent. The optimal
contract that we derive in this section can be described with the help of two
state variables: the size of the project, resulting from past downsizing and in-
vestment decisions, and the continuation utility of the agent, reflecting future
payment decisions. To build intuition, we first provide a heuristic derivation of
the principal’s value function and of the main features of the optimal contract.
Next, we verify that this candidate value function is indeed optimal and we fully
characterize the optimal contract.
4.1. A Heuristic Derivation
In this heuristic derivation, we suppose that transfers are absolutely contin-
uous with respect to time and that no payment is made after a loss, that is
dLt =Xtt1{dNt=0} dt(17)
where
t ≥ 0(18)
for all t ≥ 0. Here {t}t≥0, is assumed to be an FN -predictable process that rep-
resents the size-adjusted transfer flow to the agent. We will later verify that this
21See, for instance, Laffont and Martimort (2002, Chapters 4 and 8) for a recent overview of
that literature.
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conjecture is correct at the optimal contract. Now consider project size. Down-
sizing is suboptimal in the first-best case and, as we later verify, it remains so in
the second-best case as long as no losses occur. After losses, however, down-
sizing may prove necessary in the second-best case. This reflects that, for in-
centive purposes, it is necessary to reduce the agent’s continuation utility after
each loss by an amount that is proportional to her private benefits from shirk-
ing; the latter, in turn, are proportional to the size of the project. When the
continuation utility of the agent is low, the incentive compatibility constraint is
compatible with the limited liability constraint only if the size of the project is
itself low enough.
To see this more precisely, suppose that at the outset of time t, the size of
the project is Xt and the continuation utility of the agent is Wt− . If there is
a loss at time t, the agent’s continuation utility must be reduced from Wt− to
Wt = Wt− − Xtht . At this point, the question arises whether this loss implies
that the project should be downsized. Denote by Xt+ = lims↓t Xs ∈ [0Xt] the
size of the project just after time t. Since effort is still required from the agent,
Proposition 1 implies that if there were a second loss arbitrarily close to the
first, the continuation utility of the agent would have to be reduced further by
at least Xt+b. This would be consistent with limited liability only if Wt− −Xtht ≥
Xt+b, or, equivalently, letting wt =Wt−/Xt and xt =Xt+/Xt if
wt − ht
b
≥ xt(19)
Hence, downsizing is necessary after the first loss, that is, xt < 1, whenever the
initial size-adjusted continuation utility wt of the agent is so low that (wt −
ht)/b < 1.
We are now ready to characterize the evolution of the continuation value
F(XtWt−) of the principal. Since the principal discounts the future at rate r,
his expected flow of value at time t is given by
rF(XtWt−)(20)
This must be equal to the sum of the expected instantaneous cash flows and
of the expected rate of change in his continuation value. The former are
equal to the expected net cash flow from the project minus the cost of invest-
ment and the expected payment to the agent. By (4) and (17), this yields
Xt[μ− λC − gtc − t(1 − λdt)](21)
To evaluate the expected rate of change in the principal’s continuation value,
we use the dynamics (3) of the project’s size along with the dynamics of the
agent’s continuation utility, setting Λt = λ in (13). Applying the change of vari-
able formula for processes of bounded variation, which is the counterpart of
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Itô’s formula for these processes, yields22
[ρWt− +Xt(λht − t)]FW (XtWt−)+XtgtFX(XtWt−)(22)
−λ[F(XtWt−)− F(XtxtWt− −Xtht)]
The first term arises because of the drift of W·− , the second term corresponds to
investment, and the third term reflects the possibility of jumps in the project’s
size and in the agent’s continuation utility due to losses. Adding (22) to (21),
identifying to (20), and letting dt go to 0, we obtain that the value function of
the principal satisfies the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation
rF(XtWt−) = Xt(μ− λC)(23)
+ max{−Xtt + [ρWt− +Xt(λht − t)]FW (XtWt−)
+Xtgt[FX(XtWt−)− c]
− λ[F(XtWt−)− F(XtxtWt− −Xtht)]
}

where the maximization is over the set of controls (gtht t xt) that satisfy
constraints (5), (15), (18), and (19).
To get more insight into the structure of the solution, we impose further
restrictions on the function F that we later check to be satisfied at the optimal
contract. First, because of constant returns to scale, it is natural to require F
to be homogenous of degree 1:
F(XW )=XF
(
1
W
X
)
=Xf
(
W
X
)
for all (XW ) ∈ R++ ×R+. Intuitively, f maps the size-adjusted continuation
utility wt of the agent into the size-adjusted continuation value of the princi-
pal. Second, we require f to be globally concave. This property, which will be
formally established in the verification theorem below, has the following eco-
nomic interpretation. As argued above, while downsizing is inefficient in the
first-best case, it is necessary in the second-best case to provide incentives to
the agent when wt is low. When this is the circumstance, the principal’s value
reacts strongly to bad performance because the latter significantly raises the
risk of costly downsizing. By contrast, when wt is large, bad performance has a
more limited impact on downsizing risk. This greater sensitivity to shocks when
wt is low than when it is large is reflected in the concavity of the size-adjusted
value function f . Finally, we set
f (w)= f (b)
b
w
22See, for instance, Dellacherie and Meyer (1982, Chapter VI, Section 92).
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for all w ∈ [0 b]. This is just by convention and is done to simplify the notation,
since, by (14) and (16), wt never enters the interval [0 b).
We can now derive several properties of the optimal controls in the
Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation. Optimizing with respect to t and using
the homogeneity of F yields
f ′(wt)= FW (XtWt−)≥ −1(24)
with equality only if t > 0. Intuitively, the left-hand side of (24) is the increase
in the principal’s continuation value due to a marginal increase in the agent’s
continuation utility, while the right-hand side is the marginal cost to the prin-
cipal of making an immediate payment to the agent. It is optimal to delay pay-
ments as long as they are more costly than utility promises, that is, as long as
the inequality in (24) is strict. The concavity of f implies that this is the case
when wt is below a given threshold, which we denote by wp. The optimal con-
tract thus satisfies the following property.
PROPERTY 1: Payments to the agent are made only if her size-adjusted con-
tinuation utility is at least wp. The payment threshold wp satisfies
f ′(wp)= −1(25)
In the first-best case, all the payments to the agent would be made at time
0, as she is more impatient than the principal. By contrast, in the second-best
case, payments must be delayed and made contingent on a long enough record
of good performance, so as to provide incentives to the agent. Since f is con-
cave, it follows from (24) and (25) that f ′(w)= −1 for all w ≥wp. If one were
to start from that region, the optimal contract would entail the immediate pay-
ment of a lump sum w − wp to the agent, counterbalanced by a drop in her
size-adjusted continuation utility to wp.
Suppose that wt is below the threshold wp, implying that t = 0. Then, using
the homogeneity of F , (23) can be rewritten as
rf (wt) = μ− λC(26)
+ max
{
(ρwt + λht)f ′(wt)+ gt[f (wt)−wtf ′(wt)− c]
− λ
[
f (wt)− xtf
(
wt − ht
xt
)]}

Since f is concave and vanishes at 0, the mapping xt → xtf ((wt − ht)/xt) is
increasing. It is thus optimal to let xt be as high as possible in (26), reflecting
that downsizing is costly since the project is profitable. Using (19) along with
the fact that xt ≤ 1 then leads to the second property of the optimal contract.
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PROPERTY 2: If there is a loss at time t the optimal downsizing policy is
xt = wt − ht
b
∧ 1(27)
This property of the optimal contract reflects that, for a given level of incen-
tives as measured by ht , downsizing is imposed only as the last resort. Using
our convention that f is linear over [0 b], (27) can be substituted into (26) to
obtain
rf (wt) = μ− λC(28)
+ max{(ρwt + λht)f ′(wt)+ gt[f (wt)−wtf ′(wt)− c]
− λ[f (wt)− f (wt − ht)]
}

The concavity of f implies that it is optimal to let ht be as low as possible in
(28), which according to the incentive compatibility condition (15) leads to the
third property of the optimal contract.
PROPERTY 3: The sensitivity to losses of the agent’s continuation utility is
given by
ht = b(29)
Intuitively, (29) reflects that because the principal’s continuation value is
concave in the agent’s continuation utility, it is optimal to reduce the agent’s
exposure to risk by letting ht equal the minimal value consistent with her exert-
ing effort. In particular, downsizing takes place following a loss at date t if and
only if wt < 2b, that is, if and only if it is absolutely necessary so as to maintain
the consistency between the incentive compatibility constraint and the limited
liability constraint.
Finally turn to investment decisions. Note that the size-adjusted social value
of the project, f (w)+w, is increasing in w until wp and is flat afterward. A nec-
essary and sufficient condition for investment to ever be strictly profitable is
that the maximal size-adjusted social value of the project be larger than the
unit cost of investment:
f (wp)+wp > c(30)
If (30) did not hold, the value of investment would be lower than its cost, so
that it would be suboptimal to invest.23 Thus, as will be checked below in the
23If (30) held as an equality, whether or not investment take place would be indifferent from a
social viewpoint. Since, fixing the other parameters of the model, this can only occur for a single
value of c, we ignore that possibility in the remainder of the paper.
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verification theorem, there is some investment in the optimal contract only if c
is not too high. Optimizing in (28) with respect to gt under constraint (5), we
obtain that gt = γ if
f (wt)−wtf ′(wt) > c(31)
and gt = 0 otherwise. The left-hand side of (31) is the marginal benefit of an
additional capacity unit, while the right-hand side is the unit cost of invest-
ment. Scale expansion is optimal when the former is greater than the latter. In
that case, because of the linearity in the technology, size grows at the maximal
feasible rate γ. The concavity of f implies that (31) holds when wt is above a
given threshold, which we denote by wi. The optimal contract thus satisfies the
following property.
PROPERTY 4: Investment takes place at rate γ if and only if the size-
adjusted continuation utility of the agent is above wi. The investment threshold
wi satisfies
wi = inf{w> b | f (w)−wf ′(w) > c}(32)
In the first-best case, because of condition (1), investment always takes place
at the maximal rate γ. By contrast, in the second-best case, if c is not too low,
this is the case only if a long enough record of good performance has been ac-
cumulated. This is because increasing the size of the project raises the private
benefits from shirking and thus worsens the moral hazard problem. This jeop-
ardizes incentives, except if the agent has enough at stake to still prefer high
effort, that is, only if wt is large enough. An important alternative scenario
arises whenever c is low enough. In that case, inequality (31) is satisfied for all
wt > b, so that wi = b and it is always optimal to invest, even in the second-best
case. Formally, this is reflected in the fact that the function f is not differen-
tiable at b, with f ′−(b)= f (b)/b > f ′+(b), so that f (b)− bf ′+(b) > c for c close
enough to 0.
The dynamics of the principal’s size-adjusted continuation value depends on
whether there is investment. In the no investment region (bwi],
rf = μ− λC + Lf(33)
where the delay differential operator L is defined by
Lf (w)= (ρw+ λb)f ′(w)− λ[f (w)− f (w− b)](34)
In the investment region (wiwp],
(r − γ)f = μ− λC − γc + Lγf(35)
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where the delay differential operator Lγ is defined by
Lγf (w)= [(ρ− γ)w+ λb]f ′(w)− λ[f (w)− f (w− b)](36)
Comparing equations (35) and (36) to equations (33) and (34) reveals that, in
addition to the decrease γc in the size-adjusted cash flow, the impact of in-
vestment at rate γ is comparable to that of a decrease γ in both the principal’s
and the agent’s discount rates. Intuitively, this reflects that investment makes
delaying payments less costly, because the total size of the pie grows while the
players wait. Thus, although incentive considerations imply that both invest-
ment and payments should be delayed relative to the first-best case, investment
takes place before payments do, as stated now.
PROPERTY 5: If investment is strictly profitable the investment threshold
wi is strictly lower than the payment threshold wp.
This follows from evaluating (31) at wp, which yields f (wp)−wpf ′(wp) > c
because of (25) and (30). While investment takes place in a region where the
size-adjusted social value of the project is strictly increasing, payments are
made to the agent when the size-adjusted social value of the project reaches
its maximum, so that it is inefficient to delay payments any longer. At the pay-
ment threshold wp, transfers are constructed in such a way that the agent’s
continuation utility stays constant until there is a loss. That is, they are set to
the highest level consistent with the size-adjusted social value remaining at its
maximum. This level can be computed as follows. Setting Λt = λ in (13) and
making use of (17) and Property 3, we obtain
dWt = (ρWt +Xtλb)dt −XtbdNt −Xtt1{dNt=0} dt(37)
Suppose now that wt =wp, so that the size-adjusted social value of the project
is at its maximum and that dNt = 0, so that there is no loss at time t. Then
Wt = Xtwp and dXt = Xtγ dt. Substituting in (37), we obtain the following
property.
PROPERTY 6: If there is no loss at time t the size-adjusted transfer flow is
t = [(ρ− γ)wp + λb]1{wt=wp}(38)
According to (38), when payments are made at the payment threshold wp,
they come in a steady flow in size-adjusted terms until a loss occurs.
The above conjectures about the structure of the optimal contract are illus-
trated on Figure 1. Because of constant returns to scale, there are four regimes
in the (XtWt−) plane separated by straight lines, reflecting that downsizing,
investment, or transfers take place, depending on the position of the agent’s
size-adjusted continuation utility relative to the thresholds b, wi, and wp. Be-
cause b ≤ wt ≤ wp for all t > 0, (XtWt−) stays away from the interiors of the
downsizing and transfer regions after time 0.
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FIGURE 1.—The four regions that characterize the optimal contract. A situation in which the
contract is initiated at a point (X0W0−) that lies in the interior of the transfer region is rep-
resented. When transfers take place later on, the state variables move along the straight line
Wt− =Xtwp.
4.2. The Verification Theorem
We now show that the above heuristic characterization does correspond to
the optimal contract. To do this, we first show that there exists a size-adjusted
value function f such that Properties 1–6 hold.
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose that
μ− λC > (ρ− r)b
(
2 + r
λ
)
(39)
Then there exists a constant c > 0 such that if
c < c(40)
the delay differential equation
f (w)= f (b)
b
w if w ∈ [0 b](41)
rf (w)= μ− λC + Lf (w) if w ∈ (bwi]
(r − γ)f (w)= μ− λC − γc + Lγf (w) if w ∈ (wiwp]
f (w)= f (wp)+wp −w if w ∈ (wp∞)
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has a maximal solution f , where the thresholds wp and wi are endogenously de-
termined by (25) and (32), with wp >wi, and the operators L and Lγ are defined
as in (34) and (36). The function f is globally concave and continuously differen-
tiable except at b.
If condition (39) did not hold, the solution would be degenerate, with
downsizing taking place after each loss. This would arise because the pri-
vate benefits from shirking would be large relative to the expected cash flow
from the project, making the agency problem very severe. Condition (40)
ensures that the investment cost is low enough so that there are circum-
stances in which it is strictly optimal to increase the size of the project. If
the investment cost c were strictly larger than c, the optimal contract would
be similar to that described above, except that the investment region would
be empty. The threshold value c corresponds to the maximum of the size-
adjusted social value of the project that arises in this no investment situa-
tion.
The next steps of the analysis are to show that the function constructed
in Proposition 2 yields the maximal value that can be obtained by the prin-
cipal and to explicitly construct the optimal contract. To do so, fix an initial
project size X0 and an initial expected utility W0− for the agent, and consider
the processes {wt}t≥0 and {lt}t≥0 to be solutions to
wt =w0 +
∫ t−
0
{[(
ρ− γ1{ws>wi}
)
ws + λb
]
ds(42)
− b
(
ws − b
b
∧ 1
)
dNs − dls
}

lt = (w0 −wp)∨ 0 +
∫ t
0
[(ρ− γ)wp + λb]1{ws+=wp} ds(43)
for all t ≥ 0, where w0 = W0−/X0, and wi and wp are defined as in Proposi-
tion 2. For the moment, we simply take these processes as given. Yet, con-
sistent with the heuristic derivation of Section 4.1, it eventually turns out
in equilibrium that, at any time t, wt is the initial size-adjusted continua-
tion utility of the agent, while lt represents cumulative size-adjusted trans-
fers up to and including time t. The following proposition is central to our
results.
PROPOSITION 3: Under conditions (39) and (40), the optimal contract Γ =
(XLτ) that induces maximal risk prevention and delivers the agent an initial
expected discounted utility W0− given initial firm size X0 is as follows:
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(i) The project is downsized by a factor [(wTk − b)/b] ∧ 1 at any time Tk at
which there is a loss. Moreover the size of the project grows at rate γ as long as
wt > w
i and grows at rate 0 otherwise. As a result the size of the project is
Xt =X0
Nt−∏
k=1
(
wTk − b
b
∧ 1
)
exp
(∫ t
0
γ1{ws>wi} ds
)
(44)
at any time t ≥ 0.24
(ii) The flow of transfers to the agent isXt[(ρ−γ)wp+λb] as long aswt =wp
and no loss occurs. As a result the cumulative transfers to the agent are
Lt =X0l0 +
∫ t
0
Xs dls(45)
at any time t ≥ 0.25
(iii) Liquidation occurs with probability 0 on the equilibrium path, that is,
τ = ∞(46)
P-almost surely.
The value to the principal of this contract is F(X0W0−) = X0f (W0−/X0)
with f constructed as in Proposition 2.
As shown in the proof of Proposition 3, the optimal contract entails at any
time t a continuation utility Wt = lims↓t Xsws for the agent. The process W
obtained in this way satisfies (13) with Λt = λ and Ht =Xtb, and thus induces
maximal risk prevention. As conjectured in Section 4.1, the optimal contract
involves two state variables: the size of the project, Xt , and the size-adjusted
continuation utility of the agent, wt , or, equivalently, her beginning-of-period
continuation utility Wt− =Xtwt .
The main features of the optimal contract are also in line with the heuristic
derivation of Properties 1–6. First consider transfers, as given by (43) and (45).
If w0 >wp, an initial lump-sum is immediately distributed to the agent. Then,
at time t > 0, transfers take place if and only if wt =wp and there is no loss, and
they are constructed in such a way that the agent’s size-adjusted continuation
utility stays constant until a loss occurs. This is consistent with Properties 1
and 6.
Next consider the size of the project, as given by (44). The first term on the
right-hand side of (44) is the initial size of the firm. The second term on the
right-hand side of (44) reflects downsizing, which takes place only after losses
occur at the random times Tk and when (wTk −b)/b < 1. This is consistent with
24By convention,
∏
∅ = 1.
25Observe from (42) and (43) that wt+ =wp if and only if wt =wp and there is no loss at time t.
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Properties 2 and 3. The third term on the right-hand side of (44) reflects that
investment takes place, at rate γ, if and only if wt > wi. This is consistent with
Properties 4 and 5.
Finally consider the size-adjusted continuation utility of the agent, as given
by (42). Its dynamics is somewhat complicated, as it reflects the joint effect of
direct changes in the agent’s continuation utility and indirect changes due to
the variations in the project’s size. It follows from (42) that if a loss occurs at
a time Tk such that wTk ≥ 2b, no downsizing takes place and the size-adjusted
continuation utility of the agent drops by an amount b. This is consistent with
Property 3. By contrast, if a loss occurs at a time Tk such that b≤wTk < 2b, the
project is downsized by a factor (wTk − b)/b, and the size-adjusted continua-
tion utility of the agent drops by an amount wTk −b. Thus, in any case, the sen-
sitivity to losses of the agent’s size-adjusted continuation utility is (wTk −b)∧b.
It should be emphasized that liquidation plays virtually no role in the opti-
mal incentive contract, as reflected by (46). Indeed, as can be seen from (42),
wt =Wt−/Xt always remains strictly greater than b. As a result, Wt , which is in
the worst case equal to Wt− − Xtb if there is a loss at time t, always remains
strictly positive.26 This is in sharp contrast to the Brownian models studied by
DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), Biais, Mariotti, Plantin, and Rochet (2007),
and Sannikov (2008), in which the optimal contract relies crucially on liquida-
tion and involves no downsizing. Admittedly, even in the context of our Poisson
model, an alternative way to provide incentives to the agent in the event of bad
performance would be to threaten her to randomly liquidating the project, as is
customary in discrete-time models (see, for instance, Clementi and Hopenhayn
(2006) or DeMarzo and Fishman (2007b)). But in contrast to what happens in
Brownian models, liquidation would then necessarily have to be both stochastic
(as it would depend on the realization of a lottery at each potential liquidation
time) and unpredictable (as it would take place only after a loss). When mod-
eled in this way, liquidation allows the principal to achieve the same value as
under downsizing. This would, however, be less tractable analytically and less
conducive to a realistic implementation of the optimal contract. In addition,
and more importantly, allowing for downsizing gives rise to a richer dynam-
ics for the size of the project, which can increase but also decrease over time
following good or bad performance.
Proposition 3 describes the optimal contract for a given initial project size
X0 and a given initial expected discounted utility W0− for the agent. In Biais,
Mariotti, Rochet, and Villeneuve (2010, Section D.3), we examine how these
are determined at time 0 whenever the principal is competitive. That is, we look
for a pair (X0W0−) that maximizes utilitarian welfare under the constraint that
the principal breaks even on average. As soon as f takes strictly positive values,
it is optimal to start operating the project at full scale, X0 = 1.27 When the
26Exceptions arise only with probability 0; for instance, if W0− = X0b and there is a loss at
time 0.
27Otherwise it is optimal to let X0 =W0− = 0 and not to operate the project.
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participation constraint of the principal is slack, the contract is initiated at the
payment threshold w0 =wp, so that the agent is immediately compensated. By
contrast, when the participation constraint of the principal binds, it is necessary
to initiate the contract at a lower level w0 < wp, so that it is optimal to wait
before compensating the agent.
5. FIRM SIZE DYNAMICS
In this section, we build on the above analysis to study size dynamics under
maximal risk prevention. Because of downsizing and investment, the scale of
operations varies over time in the optimal contract. These variations can be
interpreted as the dynamics of firm size. Our model generates a rich variety of
possible paths for such dynamics. Over its life cycle, the firm can grow, stag-
nate, or decline.
To illustrate this point, consider the following typical path, depicted on Fig-
ure 2. Firm size starts at the level X0. As long as there is no loss, the size-
adjusted continuation utility of the agent rises and eventually reaches the in-
vestment threshold wi. From this point on, investment takes place at rate γ
and the firm grows. However, if a loss occurs at time Tk, the size-adjusted con-
tinuation utility of the agent drops from wTk to wT+k = (wTk − b) ∨ b. If this
lower utility level is below wi, investment stops and firm size remains constant.
Furthermore, if wT+
k
< 2b and there is another loss shortly afterward, downsiz-
ing is necessary. The corresponding path in the (XtWt−) plane is depicted on
Figure 3.
While, in the short run, firm size can grow, stagnate, or decline, it is unclear
how it is likely to behave in the long run. Will downsizing bring it down to 0
or will the firm grow indefinitely thanks to investment? To address this issue,
we study the limit as t goes to ∞ of the average growth rate of the firm until
time t. For simplicity, set X0 to 1. Then Proposition 3 implies that this average
growth rate is
ln(Xt)
t
= 1
t
[Nt−∑
k=1
ln
(
wTk − b
b
∧ 1
)
+
∫ t
0
γ1{ws>wi} ds
]
(47)
Now, let μw be the unique invariant measure associated to the process {wTk}k≥1
of the agent’s size-adjusted continuation utility just before losses, let μw+ be
the unique invariant measure associated to the process {wT+
k
}k≥1 of the agent’s
size-adjusted continuation utility just after losses, and let λ be the exponential
distribution with parameter λ. Then, using an appropriate law of large numbers
for Markov ergodic processes, the following result can be derived.28
28See, for instance, Stout (1974, Theorem 3.6.7).
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FIGURE 2.—Top panel: A sample path for the agent’s size-adjusted continuation utility. Bot-
tom panel: The corresponding path for the evolution of firm size. Investment takes place as long
as wt > wi. Losses occur at times T1–T5. Because wTk > 2b at T1, T2, and T3, losses at these times
induce a drop of b in continuation utility and no downsizing. By contrast, wTk < 2b at T4 and T5,
so that losses at these times induce a drop of wTk − b in continuation utility and downsizing by an
amount XTk −X+Tk = (2 −wTk/b)XTk .
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FIGURE 3.—The joint evolution of firm size and of the agent’s continuation utility for the sam-
ple path of the agent’s size-adjusted continuation utility illustrated on Figure 2. Dashed curves
correspond to downward jumps in the agent’s continuation utility triggered by losses at times
T1–T5; horizontal dashed lines correspond to downsizing at times T4 and T5. Arrows indicate the
direction of evolution of the state variables as long as no losses occur.
PROPOSITION 4: Under conditions (39) and (40), the long-run growth rate of
the firm is
lim
t→∞
ln(Xt)
t
= λ
∫
[b2b)
ln
(
w− b
b
)
μw(dw)(48)
+ γ
[
1 − λ
∫
[bwi)×R+
(twwi ∧ s)μw+ ⊗λ(dwds)
]

P-almost surely where
twwi = 1
ρ
ln
(
ρwi + λb
ρw+ λb
)
is the time it takes for the agent’s size-adjusted continuation utility to reach wi
when starting from w ∈ [bwi) if there are no losses in the meantime.
The first term on the right-hand side of (48) reflects the impact of down-
sizing. Downsizing takes place when losses occur, which is more likely if the
100 BIAIS, MARIOTTI, ROCHET, AND VILLENEUVE
intensity λ of the loss process N is high, and when the size-adjusted continua-
tion utility of the agent lies in the region [b2b), where downsizing cannot be
avoided whenever a loss occurs.
The second term on the right-hand side of (48) reflects the impact of in-
vestment. The latter takes place, at rate γ, when the size-adjusted continua-
tion utility of the agent is above the investment threshold wi. The term within
brackets that multiplies γ on the right-hand side of (48) is the frequency with
which the size-adjusted continuation utility of the agent is above wi. To build
intuition about this term, consider the time interval (TkTk+1] between two
consecutive losses. There is no investment during this time interval as long as
the size-adjusted continuation utility of the agent stays below wi. The proba-
bility of that event depends on the value of the continuation utility of the agent
at the beginning of the time interval, wT+
k
, as well as on the length Tk+1 − Tk of
this time interval. This is why there is a double integral in (48), with respect to
the invariant measures μw+ and λ of these two independent random variables.
The interpretation of the term in parentheses inside the double integral is that
there is no investment during (TkTk+1] if Tk+1 − Tk < tw
T+
k
wi , that is, if a loss
occurs before the size-adjusted continuation utility of the agent had the time
to reach wi starting from wT+
k
< wi.
To gain more insights into the long-run behavior of the size of the firm, con-
sider for tractability the case where c is small, so that
f (b)− bf ′+(b)≥ c(49)
In that case, the optimal contract stipulates that investment should continu-
ously take place at rate γ, and we obtain the following result.
PROPOSITION 5: Under conditions (39) (40), and (49) if γ is close to 0 then
lim
t→∞
Xt = 0(50)
P-almost surely while if γ > λ2/(ρ− γ + λ) then
lim
t→∞
Xt = ∞(51)
P-almost surely.
First consider (50). In that case, the maximal feasible growth rate γ of the
firm is low, so that the impact of investment is negligible. Now, to maintain
incentive compatibility and limited liability, downsizing must take place when
losses occur and the agent’s size-adjusted continuation utility is close to its
lower bound b. Because the stochastic process that describes the agent’s size-
adjusted continuation utility is Markov ergodic over [bwp], this situation will
LARGE RISKS AND DYNAMIC MORAL HAZARD 101
prevail an infinite number of times with probability 1. As a result, the size of
the firm and the continuation utility of the agent must eventually go to 0.
Next consider (51). In that case, the frequency λ of losses is low relative to
the maximal feasible growth rate γ of the firm, so that the positive effect of
investment dominates the negative effect of downsizing. Thus, in the long run,
the firm becomes infinitely large. Note, however, that, even in this case, the
long-run growth rate of the firm remains strictly lower than in the first-best
case, because of downsizing.
These two asymptotic results differ from the classic immiserization result of
Thomas and Worrall (1990). In their model, the agent’s continuation utility
eventually diverges to −∞, but the reason why this outcome obtains differs
from the reason why, in our model, firm size goes to 0 when γ is low. Indeed,
in Thomas and Worrall (1990), the period utility function of the agent is con-
cave and unbounded below. Consequently, providing incentives is cheaper, the
lower is the agent’s continuation utility. This reflects the fact that the cost of
obtaining a given spread in the agent’s continuation utility is then lower. The
principal thus has an incentive to let the agent’s utility drift to −∞. By con-
trast, in our model, the cost of incentive compatibility is high when the agent’s
continuation utility is low. This reflects the fact that limited liability makes it
then more difficult to induce large variations in the agent’s continuation utility.
Yet, firm size can go to 0 if γ is low relative to λ, so that the effect of down-
sizing overcomes that of investment. If γ is high relative to λ, firm size goes to
infinity. Now, the continuation utility of the agent is equal to her size-adjusted
continuation utility, which by construction lives in [bwp], multiplied by firm
size. Hence in that case, the continuation utility of the agent grows unbound-
edly, which is exactly the opposite of the immiserization result.
Proposition 5 provides parameter restrictions under which firm size Xt un-
ambiguously goes to 0 or ∞ with probability 1 when t goes to ∞. More gener-
ally, for all parameter values, including those under which (49) does not hold,
the following holds.
PROPOSITION 6: Under conditions (39) and (40) each of the events
{limt→∞Xt = 0} and {limt→∞Xt = ∞} has either a probability 0 or 1 of occurring.
The intuition for this result is twofold. First, as can be seen from (44), the
events that firm size Xt goes to 0 or to ∞ are tail events. That is, whether they
occur depends on what happens in the long run, not on what happens over
any finite horizon. Second, the stochastic processes that drive the evolution
of firm size satisfy a mixing property, which implies that tail events have either
probability 0 or 1. Note that Proposition 6 does not assert that one of the events
{limt→∞Xt = 0} and {limt→∞Xt = ∞} must occur with probability 1: both of
them may have probability 0. What it rules out, for instance, is a scenario in
which, with probability p, the size of the firm eventually vanishes, while with
probability 1 −p it eventually explodes, for some p ∈ (01).
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This asymptotic result sharply differs from that arising in Clementi and
Hopenhayn (2006). In their long-run analysis, either the firm is eventually liq-
uidated or the first-best case is eventually attained and the firm is never liqui-
dated. Each of these absorbing outcomes has a strictly positive probability in
the stationary distribution. This difference with our results stems from the fact
that, in their model, the principal and the agent have identical discount rates,
while in ours, the agent is more impatient than the principal.29 In Clementi and
Hopenhayn (2006), because the principal and the agent are equally patient, it
is costless to delay the agent’s consumption while capitalizing it at the com-
mon discount rate. Hence, it is optimal to try and accumulate pledges to the
agent until her savings are so high that she can buy the firm and implement
the first-best case policy. With some probability, the agent is lucky enough that
such high performance is achieved and the first-best case is attained. With the
complementary probability, the agent is not as lucky, and liquidation eventu-
ally occurs. By contrast, in our model, delaying consumption is costly, since
the agent is more impatient than the principal. It is, therefore, optimal to let
her consume before the first-best case is attained. This reduces the growth in
the accumulated pledge to the agent, which, in turn, raises the risk of downsiz-
ing. Whenever the maximal investment rate is low, such downsizing eventually
brings firm size to 0 with probability 1. Whenever the maximal investment rate
is high, firm size tends to grow so fast that it eventually explodes in spite of
downsizing. Note, however, that in that case, the first-best case is not attained,
even in the long run, because moral hazard still slows down the rate at which
the firm grows.
6. ROBUSTNESS
In this section, we discuss the robustness of our results. We first provide
sufficient conditions for the optimality of maximal risk prevention. Then we
briefly examine the case of nonconstant returns to scale.
6.1. Optimality of Maximal Risk Prevention
So far, our analysis has focused on the optimal contract under maximal risk
prevention. We now investigate under which circumstances it is actually opti-
mal for the principal to require such a high level of effort from the agent. For
simplicity, we conduct this analysis in the case where there is no investment,
that is, γ = 0.
Note that the contract characterized in Proposition 3 depends on B and λ
only through their ratio b = B/λ. Hence there is 1 degree of freedom in the
29In Clementi and Hopenhayn’s (2006) discrete-time model, unlike in our continuous-time
model, identical discount rates for the principal and the agent do not preclude the existence of
an optimal contract. A further difference is that they assumed that capital fully depreciates from
one period to the next, while there is no capital depreciation in our model.
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parameters of the model, as B and λ can be scaled up or down while keeping
b constant, leaving the optimal contract under maximal risk prevention unaf-
fected. Intuition suggests that when λ gets large, it is optimal to prevent losses
as much as possible. To see why, observe that if a contract induced shirking dur-
ing some infinitesimal time interval [t t + dt), the agent’s continuation utility
would not need to be affected were a loss to occur at time t; that is, Ht = 0
in (13). Since it is optimal to make no transfers over [t t + dt) as the agent is
shirking, (13) then implies that this would result in a change
dwt = (ρwt −B)dt(52)
in the agent’s size-adjusted continuation utility. To determine whether requir-
ing the agent to always exert effort is optimal, we compare the continuation
value of the principal under maximal risk prevention to its counterpart when
the agent shirks during [t t + dt) and then reverts to exerting effort. The for-
mer is greater than the latter if
f (wt)≥ [μ− (λ+λ)C]dt + e−rdtf (wt + dwt)(53)
where dwt is given by (52). The first term on the right-hand side of (53) re-
flects the increased intensity of losses over [t t + dt) due to shirking, while the
second term corresponds to the continuation value to the principal from re-
questing maximal risk prevention from time t+dt on. Given (52), a first-order
Taylor expansion in (53) leads to
rf (wt)≥ μ− (λ+λ)C + (ρwt −B)f ′(wt)(54)
Unlike in (33), there is no delay term on the right-hand side of (54), because
the agent’s continuation utility is not sensitive to losses during the time interval
[t t + dt). Maximal risk prevention is optimal if (54) holds for any value of
wt > b. The following result is found.
PROPOSITION 7: Suppose that γ = 0 and fix all the parameters of the model
except B and λ for which only the ratio b= B/λ is fixed so that an increase in
B is compensated by a proportional increase in λ. Then there exists a threshold
λ > 0 such that the optimal contract involves maximal risk prevention for all
λ> λ.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Both B and λ affect the magnitude
of the moral hazard problem and, therefore, the cost of incentives. However,
under maximal risk prevention, they do so only via their ratio b; formally, this
is reflected in the fact that the function f depends on B and λ only through
b. Now, while an increase in λ makes shirking easier to detect, and raises the
value to the principal of a high level of risk prevention effort, an increase in
B leaves this value unaffected. Hence, when b and thus the cost of incentives
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is kept constant, increasing λ raises the benefit of effort for the principal
without affecting its cost. As a result, when λ is sufficiently high, it is optimal
for the principal to require the agent to always exert effort.
6.2. Nonconstant Returns to Scale
Our analysis relies on the assumption that there are constant returns to scale.
What can be said when one relaxes this assumption? Suppose, for instance,
that the private benefits from shirking are equal to some increasing function
B(X) of firm size X and, for simplicity, keep all other assumptions unchanged.
Incentive compatibility conditions are basically the same in that extension. The
continuation utility of the agent is written as
Wt(ΓΛ)= EΛ
[∫ τ
t
e−ρ(s−t)
[
dLs + 1{Λs=λ+λ}B(Xs)ds
]∣∣∣FNt
]
1{t<τ}
and the underlying martingale is still MΛ, so that the martingale representation
theorem applies and Lemma 1 continues to hold. Similarly, Proposition 1 is
essentially unchanged, except that the incentive compatibility condition under
which the agent exerts effort is now
Ht(ΓΛ)≥ B(Xt)
λ

Suppose now that the principal wants to implement maximal risk prevention.
Then, as when returns to scale are constant, it will be necessary to downsize
the project after a loss if the agent’s continuation utility is too low. To see this
more precisely, suppose that, at the outset of time t, the size of the project is
Xt and the continuation utility of the agent is Wt−(ΓΛ). If there is a loss at
time t, incentive compatibility requires that the continuation utility be reduced
by at least B(Xt)/λ. Downsizing can be avoided at this point only if the new
level of continuation utility is high enough that it is still possible to provide
incentives while satisfying the limited liability constraint, that is, if
Wt−(ΓΛ)− B(Xt)
λ
≥ B(Xt)
λ

Thus downsizing must take place whenever Wt−(ΓΛ) < 2B(Xt)/λ and there
is a loss at time t. Yet, it is hard to push the analysis of the optimal con-
tract much further without assuming constant returns to scale. Indeed, the
Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation now is written as
rF(XtWt−) = Xt(μ− λC)(55)
+ max{−Xtt + (ρWt− + λHt −Xtt)FW (XtWt−)
+Xtgt[FX(XtWt−)− c]
− λ[F(XtWt−)− F(XtxtWt− −Ht)]
}

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where the maximization in (55) is over the set of controls (gtHt t xt) that
satisfy (5), (18), and the two constraints
Ht ≥ B(Xt)
λ
(56)
Wt− −Ht ≥ B(Xtxt)
λ

The first of these constraints is the agent’s date t incentive compatibility con-
straint, while the second, which parallels (19), expresses the fact that if a loss
occurs at date t, reducing by Ht the continuation utility of the agent, it must
still be possible to provide incentives after this loss, which requires being able
to further reduce the agent’s utility by B(Xtxt)/λ, where Xtxt is the size of
the firm after the date t loss. Unlike in the constant returns to scale case, the
nonlinearity of B(X) with respect to X makes it impossible to reduce the delay
partial differential equation (55) to a delay ordinary differential equation.
While it is difficult to rigorously study the system (55)–(56) when B(X) is not
linear in X , a heuristic analysis similar to that in Section 4.1 can be performed
for a small perturbation of the private benefits function:
Bε(X)= BX + εXφ(X)
where ε is a small number and φ is a bounded function. This analysis, which
can be found in the supplement (Biais, Mariotti, Rochet, and Villeneuve
(2010)), suggests that, under regularity conditions, the qualitative properties of
the optimal contract can reasonably be expected to be upheld for such a small
perturbation. The optimal contract could then be depicted on a figure simi-
lar to Figure 1. The differences would be that the boundary of the downsizing
region would be the nonlinear function Bε(X)/λ of firm size X instead of
the linear function Xb, and that the upper and lower boundaries of the invest-
ment/no transfers region would also presumably be nonlinear functions of X .
7. EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS
While, in the first-best case, firms in our model should always invest, in the
second-best case the optimal contract stipulates that firms can invest only after
a long enough record of good performance, at least when the unit cost of in-
vestment is not too low.30 Such clauses are consistent with the empirical results
of Kaplan and Strömberg (2004), who found that venture capital funding for
new investment is contingent on financial and nonfinancial milestones. They
also found that such conditioning is more frequent when the proxy for agency
problems is more severe.
30Throughout this section, we assume that f (b)− bf ′+(b) < c < c, so that wi > b.
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In our model, the optimal contract specifies that after good performance,
agents will be compensated, while after bad performance, the firm will be par-
tially liquidated. This is in line with the contractual clauses documented by
Kaplan and Strömberg (2003). The circumstances in which downsizing takes
place in the optimal contract can be interpreted as financial distress. This is in
line with the empirical findings of Denis and Shome (2005), who reported that
financially distressed firms are often downsized.
In our model, small firms tend to be below the investment threshold. They
are thus likely to be exposed to financial constraints on investment, as doc-
umented by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005). Our model also
predicts that small firms are relatively more fragile, since a few negative shocks
are enough to drive them into the zone where further losses trigger downsiz-
ing. Conversely, large firms that have enjoyed long periods of sustained in-
vestment are more likely to have long records of good performance, which
pushes them away from that zone. Overall, the probability of downsizing is
decreasing in firm size. This is in line with the empirical findings of Dunne,
Roberts, and Samuelson (1989), who reported that failure rates decline with
increases in firm or plant size. Note, however, that the same logic implies that,
according to our model, large firms should tend to have higher growth rates
than smaller ones, while data suggest that on average the opposite is true; see
Evans (1987a, 1987b) and Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1989). Interest-
ingly, though, Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1989) found that this pattern
is reversed in the case of multiplant firms: mean growth rates for plants owned
by such firms tend to increase with size, reflecting that the tendency for growth
rates of plants to decline with size is outweighed by a substantial fall in their
failure rates. This evidence suggests that our analysis is particularly relevant
for multiplant firms. A further testable implication of our model is that down-
sizing decisions should typically be followed by relatively long periods during
which no investment takes place, corresponding to the time it takes for the firm
to reach the investment threshold again and resume growing.
Gabaix and Landier (2008) noted that different theoretical explanations
have been offered for variations in CEO pay. While some analyses empha-
size incentive problems, Gabaix and Landier (2008) proposed to focus on firm
size. Empirically, they found that CEO pay increases with firm size. Consistent
with these results, our incentive theoretic analysis implies that the size of the
firm and the compensation of the agent ought to be positively correlated: after
a long stream of good performance, the scale of operations is large and so are
the payments to the agent. Conceptually, our analysis suggests that explana-
tions based on size should not be divorced from explanations based on incen-
tives, and that investment and managerial compensation are complementary
incentive instruments, in line with the empirical findings of Kaplan and Ström-
berg (2003).
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8. CONCLUSION
This paper analyzes the dynamic moral hazard problem arising when agents
with limited liability must exert costly unobservable effort to reduce the like-
lihood of large but relatively infrequent losses. We characterize the optimal
downsizing, investment, and compensation policies, and provide explicit for-
mulae for firm size and its asymptotic growth rate.
Our analysis generates policy and managerial implications for the prevention
of large risks. Losses in our model are negative externalities, since they affect
society beyond the managers’ or the firms’ ability to pay for the damages they
cause. It is, therefore, natural to think of the optimal dynamic contract as a
regulatory tool. For instance, in the context of financial institutions, our analy-
sis suggests that to prevent large losses, downsizing and investment decisions
should be made contingent on accumulated performance. This notably pro-
vides a rationale for prudential regulations that request that the scale at which
financial firms operate be proportionate to their capital. In particular, such reg-
ulations imply that banks or insurance companies should be downsized if their
capital before large losses is close to the regulatory requirement. This is sim-
ilar to our optimal contract, provided W is interpreted as a proxy for capital,
which is natural since both increase after good performance and decrease af-
ter bad performance. Yet our analysis suggests that such capital requirements
are not sufficient to induce an optimal level of risk prevention: they should
be complemented by an appropriate regulation of managerial compensation.
More specifically, the managers’ compensation should be based on long-term
track records, and it should be reduced after large losses by an amount that in-
creases with the private benefits from shirking and the extent to which shirking
is difficult to detect.
Our analysis also generates implications for firm size dynamics. Simon and
Bonini (1958) and Ijiri and Simon (1964) analyzed the link between the sto-
chastic process according to which firms grow and the size distribution of firms.
While these early works do not rely on the characterization of optimal invest-
ment policies, they have been embedded within the neoclassical framework;
see, for instance, Lucas (1978) or Luttmer (2007, 2008). In these models, firm
growth is limited by technology. In Lucas (1978), managerial skills are assumed
to exhibit diminishing returns to scale, while in Luttmer (2008), it is assumed
that when ideas are replicated, their quality depreciates. Our modeling frame-
work offers an opportunity to revisit these issues in a context where the en-
dogenous limits to firm growth result from moral hazard. A key issue in models
of the size distribution of firms is whether Gibrat’s law holds, that is, whether
firm growth is independent of firm size. This is not the case in our model,
since firm size, and downsizing and investment decisions are correlated in the
optimal contract, being all functions of the agent’s size-adjusted continuation
utility process. It would be interesting, in further research, to analyze the im-
plications of our analysis for the size distribution of firms.
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APPENDIX: SKETCHES OF PROOFS
In this appendix, we merely outline the structure of the proofs. The inter-
ested reader can find complete proofs in the supplement (Biais, Mariotti, Ro-
chet, and Villeneuve (2010)). All the references hereafter made to sections and
auxiliary results correspond to this supplementary document.
PROOF OF LEMMA 1—Sketch: The predictable representation (12) of the
martingale U(ΓΛ) follows from Brémaud (1981, Chapter III, Theorems T9
and T17). The factor e−ρs in (12) is just a convenient rescaling. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1—Sketch: The proof extends Sannikov’s (2008,
Proposition 2) arguments to the case where output is modeled as a point
process. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2—Sketch: It turns out to be more convenient to
work with the size-adjusted social value function, defined by v(w)= f (w)+w
for all w≥ 0. Just as f , the function v is linear over [0 b]. From (33) and (35)
rv(w)= μ− λC − (ρ− r)w+ Lv(w)(57)
for all w ∈ (bwi] and
(r − γ)v(w)= μ− λC − γc − (ρ− r)w+ Lγv(w)(58)
for all w ∈ (wiwp]. The investment threshold wi satisfies
wi = inf{w> b | v(w)−wv′(w) > c}(59)
while the payment threshold wp satisfies
v′(wp)= 0(60)
Finally, v is constant and equal to v(wp) over [wp∞). The proof consists of
two main parts. In the first part of the proof (Section C.1), we suppose that
investment is not feasible, that is, γ = 0. This allows us to pin down the constant
c in (40) and provides key insights into the properties of the solution to (41) in
the no investment region (bwi]. In the second part of the proof (Section C.2),
we suppose that investment is feasible, that is, γ > 0, and we use the results of
the first part of the proof to solve (41).
Part 1: In the no investment case, we look for the maximal solution to (57)
that satisfies (60) at some payment threshold. Note that the only unknown pa-
rameter is the slope of that solution over [0 b]. To determine that slope, we
use the following shooting method. For each β ≥ 0, denote by vβ the func-
tion that is linear with slope β over [0 b] and then satisfies (57) over (b∞).
It can be shown that vβ can be decomposed over R+ as u1 + βu2, where u2
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is a nonnegative function with strictly positive derivative.31 This implies that
the derivatives of the functions (vβ)β≥0 are strictly increasing with respect to β
(Proposition C.1.1). We then prove that the ratio −u′1/u′2 attains a maximum
β0 over (b∞), which implies that vβ0 is the maximal function in the family
(vβ)β≥0 whose derivative has a zero in (b∞) (Proposition C.1.2). Thus vβ0
is the desired maximal solution. Let wpβ0 be the first point at which v
′
β0
van-
ishes. The last step of the proof then consists of showing that vβ0 is concave
over [0wpβ0], and strictly so over [bwpβ0] (Proposition C.1.3). As explained in
the text, the cost threshold c below which investment is strictly profitable is
vβ0(w
p
β0
). For c > c, the size-adjusted social value function is vβ0 ∧ vβ0(wpβ0)
(Section D.2, Remark).
Part 2: In the investment case, we look for the maximal solution to (57) and
(58) that satisfies (59) and (60) at some investment and payment thresholds.
As in part 1, the only unknown parameter is the slope of v over [0 b]. To
determine that slope, which must clearly be higher than β0, we use the fol-
lowing shooting method. For each β ≥ β0, denote by vβγ the function that is
linear with slope β over [0 b] and then satisfies (57) over (bwiβ] and (58)
over (wiβ∞), where wiβ = inf{w > b | vβγ(w)−wv′βγ(w) > c}. We may have
wiβ = b, in which case the region (bwiβ] is empty. We first show that vβγ is
well defined, and that the threshold wiβ belongs to [bwpβ0) and continuously
decreases as β increases (Lemma C.2.1). Key to this result is the fact that u2
is strictly concave over [b∞). We then show that, in analogy with the func-
tions (vβ)β≥0, the derivatives of the functions (vβγ)β≥β0 are strictly increasing
with respect to β (Proposition C.2.1). The next step of the proof, which is cru-
cial, consists of showing that there exists a maximal function vβγγ in the family
(vβγ)β≥β0 whose derivative has a zero in (b∞) (Proposition C.2.2). To es-
tablish this result, we first show that the set of β ≥ β0 such that v′βγ has a
zero over (b∞) is a nonempty interval I that contains β0 (Lemma C.2.2).
Second, we show that I has a finite upper bound βγ , so that v′βγ has no zero
in (b∞) when β > βγ (Lemma C.2.3). Third, letting wpβγ be the first point
at which v′βγ vanishes for any given β ∈ I, we show that wpβγ is strictly in-
creasing with respect to β over I and converges to a finite limit when β con-
verges to βγ from below (Lemma C.2.4). Fourth, we show that the deriva-
tives of the functions (vβγ)β≥β0 vary continuously with β, which in turn implies
that I contains its upper bound βγ (Lemma C.2.5). Thus vβγγ is the desired
maximal solution and wpβγγ is the first point at which v
′
βγγ
vanishes. The last
step of the proof then consists of showing that vβγγ is concave over [0wpβγγ]
and strictly so over [bwpβγγ] (Proposition C.2.3). Key to this result is the fact
that βγ > β0 and that the maximal solution vβ0 derived in the no investment
case is concave over [0wpβ0] as established in Proposition C.1.3. Finally, let-
31The functions u1, u2, and vβ are continuously differentiable except at b.
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ting f (w) = vβγγ(w) ∧ vβγγ(wpβγγ) − w for all w ≥ 0 and writing wi = wiβγ
and wp = wiβγγ to simplify notation, it is immediate to check that the triple
(fwiwp) satisfies all the properties stated in Proposition 2. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3—Sketch: The argument follows somewhat stan-
dard lines in optimal control theory. In the first step of the proof, we establish
that F provides an upper bound for the expected payoff that the principal can
obtain from any incentive compatible contract that induces maximal risk pre-
vention, that is,
F(X0W0−)≥ E
[∫ τ
0
e−rt
{
Xt[(μ− gtc)dt −CdNt] − dLt
}]
(61)
for any contract Γ = (XLτ) that induces maximal risk prevention. For any
such contract, the dynamics of the agent’s continuation utility W is given by
(13) for a process H that satisfies the incentive compatibility condition (14).
Substituting X and L from Γ into the function F , and applying the change of
variable formula for processes of locally bounded variation (Dellacherie and
Meyer (1982, Chapter VI, Section 92)) yields
F(X0W0−) = e−rTF(XT+WT)(62)
−
∫ T
0
e−rt[(ρWt− + λHt)FW (XtWt−)
− rF(XtWt−)]dt
−
∫ T
0
e−rtFX(XtWt−)(dXdct +Xtgt dt)
+
∫ T
0
e−rtFW (XtWt−)dLct
−
∑
t∈[0T ]
e−rt[F(Xt+Wt)− F(XtWt−)]
for all T ∈ [0 τ), where Xdc and Lc stand for the pure continuous parts of Xd
and L. Imposing limited liability and incentive compatibility, along with the
homogeneity of F , the concavity of f , and the fact that f ′+ ≥ −1, we show that,
in expectation, the right-hand side of (62) is greater than that of (61).
In the second step of the proof, we establish that the contract described
in Proposition 3 yields the principal a value F(X0W0−). This contract must,
therefore, be optimal, since, from the first step of the proof, F(X0W0−) is an
upper bound for the value that the principal can derive from any contract that
induces maximal risk prevention. Specifically, we start from (62) and we use
the properties of the contract spelled out in Properties 1–6, and more precisely
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described in Proposition 3, to show that, in expectation, the right-hand side of
(62) is in this case equal to that of (61). Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4—Sketch: In the first step of the proof, we estab-
lish that the process {wTk}k≥1 is Markov ergodic and then rely on the strong law
of large numbers for Markov ergodic processes (Stout (1974, Theorem 3.6.7))
to show that
lim
t→∞
1
t
Nt−∑
k=1
ln
(
wTk − b
b
∧ 1
)
= λ
∫
[b2b)
ln
(
w− b
b
)
μw(dw)(63)
P-almost surely. The main technical difficulty consists of proving that the inte-
gral on the right-hand side of (63) is finite.
In the second step of the proof, we establish that
lim
t→∞
1
t
∫ TN
t−
0
1{ws>wi} ds = 1 − λ
∫
[bwi)×R+
(twwi ∧ s)μw+ ⊗λ(dwds)(64)
P-almost surely. The argument goes as follows. Consider for each k ≥ 1 the
integral Ik =
∫ Tk
Tk−1
1{ws>wi} ds, where T0 = 0 by convention. If wT+k−1 ≥ wi, then
ws > w
i for all s ∈ (Tk−1Tk], and thus Ik = Tk − Tk−1. If wT+
k−1 < w
i and Tk −
Tk−1 ≤ tw
T+
k−1
wi , then ws ≤ wi for all s ∈ (Tk−1Tk], and thus Ik = 0. Last, if
wT+
k−1 <w
i and Tk−Tk−1 > tw
T+
k−1
wi , then ws > wi for all s ∈ (Tk−1 +tw
T+
k−1
wi  Tk],
and thus Ik = Tk −Tk−1 − tw
T+
k−1
wi . Summing over k= 1     n and rearranging
yields
1
n
∫ Tn
0
1{ws>wi} ds =
1
n
n∑
k=1
(Tk − Tk−1)(65)
− 1
n
n∑
k=1
[
tw
T+
k−1
wi ∧ (Tk − Tk−1)
]
1{w
T+
k−1
<wi}
for all n≥ 1. Since the random variables (Tk − Tk−1)k≥1 are independently and
identically distributed according to the exponential distribution λ, it follows
from the strong law of large numbers that the sequence ( 1
n
∑n
k=1(Tk −Tk−1))n≥1
converges P-almost surely to 1/λ. Furthermore, we show that the process
{(wT+
k−1Tk − Tk−1)}k≥1 is Markov ergodic, with invariant measure μw+ ⊗ λ
over [bwp] × R+. Since the function (w s) → (twwi ∧ s)1{w<wi} is measur-
able, nonnegative, and bounded above by (w s) → s, and hence is μw+ ⊗ λ-
integrable, it follows from the strong law of large numbers for Markov ergodic
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processes (Stout (1974, Theorem 3.6.7)) that the sequence ( 1
n
∑n
k=1[twT+
k−1
wi ∧
(Tk − Tk−1)]1{w
T+
k−1
<wi})n≥1 converges P-almost surely to
∫
[bwp]×R+
(twwi ∧ s)1{w<wi}μw+ ⊗λ(dwds)
=
∫
[bwi)×R+
(twwi ∧ s)μw+ ⊗λ(dwds)
Using the fact that Nt−/t converges P-almost surely to λ as t goes to ∞ by the
strong law of large numbers for the Poisson process then yields (64).
In the last step of the proof, we establish that
lim
t→∞
1
t
∫ t
TN
t−
1{ws>wi} ds = 0(66)
P-almost surely. Merging (63), (64), and (66) finally leads to (48). Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5—Sketch: We first check that (49) holds uni-
formly in γ whenever c is close enough to 0. This implies that the expression
(48) for the long-run growth rate of the firm simplifies to
lim
t→∞
ln(Xt)
t
= λ
∫
[b2b)
ln
(
w− b
b
)
μw(dw)+ γ(67)
The remainder of the proof consists of constructing upper and lower bounds
for the integral on the right-hand side of (67).
To construct the upper bound, we first define wp = (μ − λC)/(ρ − r) and
show that wp < wp uniformly in γ. We then define auxiliary processes {wt}t≥0
and {lt}t≥0 by
wt =w0 +
∫ t−
0
{
(ρws + λb)ds− b
(
ws − b
b
∧ 1
)
dNs − dls
}

lt = max{w0 −wp0} +
∫ t
0
(ρwp + λb)1{ws+=wp} ds
for all t ≥ 0, that are independent of γ. It is easy to check that wt ≤ wt for all
t ≥ 0 and that {wTk}k≥1 has a unique stationary initial distribution μw. Further-
more, ∫
[b2b)
ln
(
w− b
b
)
μw(dw)≤
∫
[b2b)
ln
(
w− b
b
)
μw(dw) < 0
uniformly in γ, which yields the desired upper bound. The strict inequality
follows from the fact that for each k≥ 1 and w ∈ (bwp], there is for each ε > 0
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close enough to 0 a strictly positive probability that wTk+1 <w given that wTk =
w + ε, which implies that the lower bound of the support of the stationary
initial distribution μw of {wTk}k≥1 is b. Therefore, for γ close enough to 0,
λ
∫
[b2b)
ln
(
w− b
b
)
μw(dw)+ γ < 0
which establishes (50).
The lower bound is provided by the fact that
∫
[b2b) ln((w− b)/b)μw(dw) is
finite (Section E, Proof of Proposition 4, Claim 1, Step 2). Specifically, one can
show that∫
[b2b)
ln
(
w− b
b
)
μw(dw)≥ − λ
ρ− γ + λ
uniformly in γ. Therefore, if γ > λ2/(ρ− γ + λ),
λ
∫
[b2b)
ln
(
w− b
b
)
μw(dw)+ γ > 0
which establishes (51). Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6—Sketch: Consider for each k≥ 1 the σ-fields
Fk1 = σ
(
(w0T1 − T0)
(
wT1T2 − T1
)
    
(
wTk−1Tk − Tk−1
))

F ∞k = σ
((
wTk−1Tk − Tk−1
)

(
wTkTk+1 − Tk
)
   
)

and denote by
T =
∞⋂
k=1
F ∞k
the corresponding tail σ-field. The first step of the proof consists of showing
that for each E ∈ T , either P[E] = 0 or P[E] = 1. To establish this zero–one
law, we first show that for each ε > 0, there exists n0 ≥ 1 such that
(knw tA)(68)
= P[(wTk+n−1Tk+n − Tk+n−1) ∈A | (wTk−1Tk − Tk−1)= (w t)]
− P[(wTk+n−1Tk+n − Tk+n−1 ∈A)]
≤ ε
for all k≥ 1, n≥ n0, (w t) ∈ [bwp]×R+, and A ∈ B([bwp]×R+). Following
Bártfai and Révész (1967, Example 2), we can then show that a consequence
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of condition (68) is that for each ε > 0, there exists n0 ≥ 1 such that the mixing
property
P[E | Fk1 ] − P[E] ≤ ε(69)
holds for all k ≥ 1, n ≥ n0, and E ∈ F ∞k+n, P-almost surely. Fix some E ∈ T ,
so that in particular E ∈ F ∞k+n for all n ≥ n0. Since ε is arbitrary, the mix-
ing property (69) then implies that P[E | Fk1 ] ≤ P[E] for all k ≥ 1, P-almost
surely. From Doob (1953, Chapter VII, Theorem 4.3), it follows that P[E |∨∞
k=1 Fk1 ] ≤ P[E], P-almost surely. Since E ∈ T ⊂
∨∞
k=1 Fk1 , we finally have
P[E] = ∫
E
P[E | ∨∞k=1 Fk1 ]dP ≤ ∫E P[E]dP = P[E]2. Thus either P[E] = 0 or
P[E] = 1, as claimed.
The second step of the proof consists of showing that each of the events
{limn→∞ XTn = 0} and {limn→∞XT+n = ∞} belongs to T . First consider{limn→∞ XTn = 0}. Fix some k0 ≥ 1. For each n≥ k0 + 1, we have
XTn = X0
N
T−n∏
k=1
(
wTk − b
b
∧ 1
)
exp
(∫ Tn
0
γ1{ws>wi} ds
)
= X0
n−1∏
k=1
(
wTk − b
b
∧ 1
)
× exp
(
γ
{
n∑
k=1
(Tk − Tk−1)
−
n∑
k=1
[
tw
T+
k−1
wi ∧ (Tk − Tk−1)
]
1{w
T+
k−1
<wi}
})
= XTk0
n−1∏
k=k0
(
wTk − b
b
∧ 1
)
× exp
(
γ
{
n∑
k=k0+1
(Tk − Tk−1)
−
n∑
k=k0+1
[
tw
T+
k−1
wi ∧ (Tk − Tk−1)
]
1{w
T+
k−1
<wi}
})
with
∏
∅ = 1 by convention, where the second equality follows from (65) and
from the fact that NT−n = n−1. Since XTk0 is a strictly positive random variable,
it follows that {limn→∞XTn = 0} ∈ F ∞k0+1. Since k0 is arbitrary, {limn→∞XTn =
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0} ∈ T . The proof for {limn→∞XT+n = ∞} is similar, observing that
XT+n = XT+k0
n∏
k=k0+1
(
wTk − b
b
∧ 1
)
× exp
(
γ
{
n∑
k=k0+1
(Tk − Tk−1)
−
n∑
k=k0+1
[
tw
T+
k−1
wi ∧ (Tk − Tk−1)
]
1{w
T+
k−1
<wi}
})
and that XT+
k0
is a finite random variable.
Finally, to conclude the proof, we verify that {limt→∞Xt = 0} =
{limn→∞ XTn = 0} and {limt→∞Xt = ∞} = {limn→∞XT+n = ∞}. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7: Define wpβ0 as in the proof of Proposition 2. It
can be shown that
rf (wt)≥ μ− λC + (ρwt + λb)f ′(wt)− λ[f (wt)− f (wt − b)](70)
for any value of wt > b, with equality if wt ∈ (bwpβ0] (Section D.2, Remark).
Hence a sufficient condition for (54) to hold is that the right-hand side of (70)
be larger than the right-hand side of (54), which is the case if
λ[C + bf ′(wt)] ≥ λ[f (wt)− f (wt − b)− bf ′(wt)](71)
since b = B/λ. The right-hand side of (71) is nonnegative by concavity of f
and it is bounded because f is affine over (wpβ0∞). Consider next the left-hand
side of (71). By (2), we have C > b, reflecting that maximal risk prevention
is socially optimal in the first-best case.32 Since f ′ ≥ −1, this implies that the
mapping C +bf ′ is strictly positive and bounded away from 0. Since f depends
on B and λ only through their ratio b, it follows that (71) is satisfied for any
value of wt > b when λ is high enough, while B is proportionally adjusted so
as to keep b constant. The result follows. Q.E.D.
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